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Abstract
In light of climate change and other global threats, policy commentators sometimes
urge that society should be more concerned about catastrophes. This paper reflects on
what society’s attitude toward low-probability, high-impact events is, or should be. We
first argue that catastrophe risk can be conceived of as a spread in the distribution of
losses. Based on this conception, we review studies from decision sciences, psychology,
and behavioral economics that elicit people’s attitudes toward various social risks. We
find more evidence against than in favor of catastrophe aversion—the preference for a
mean-preserving contraction of the loss distribution—and discuss a number of possible
behavioral explanations. Next, we turn to social choice theory and examine how various
social welfare functions handle catastrophe risk. We explain why catastrophe aversion
may be in conflict with equity concerns and other-regarding preferences. Finally, we
discuss current approaches to evaluate and regulate catastrophe risk.
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1 Introduction
Catastrophes have always been a prominent theme in environmental and resource economics.
Debates about doomsday models (Solow 1972), resource exhaustion (Dasgupta and Heal
1974), and the irreversibility e ect (Arrow and Fisher 1974) have had a lasting e ect on the
discipline. More recently, man-made environmental threats like ozone layer depletion and
climate change have attracted a lot of attention and technological ‘remedies’ to alleviate these
threats—geo-engineering for instance—present their own catastrophic potential. In response,
the behavioral and social sciences are witnessing an upsurge of interest in catastrophic and
even existential risks (Posner 2004; Diamond 2005; Sunstein 2007; Bostrom and Cirkovic
2008; Taleb 2010; Barro and Ursua 2012, Wiener 2015).
In this paper we present and discuss a conceptual framework that—or so we believe—
is useful for environmental economists because it enables us to think systematically about
catastrophes. A straightforward way to gauge the rising interest in economics is to count
papers published in leading journals that contain keywords related to catastrophes and disas-
ters. Figure 1 displays the results of such a bibliometric analysis, demonstrating the e ective
upsurge of interest since the early 2000s.1
In recent years, economists have devoted special attention to the modeling of climate
catastrophes. The following are some important contributions. In his dismal theorem, Weitz-
man (2009) is concerned with the implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of
low-probability, high-impact catastrophes. He provocatively argues that cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) cannot be used to assess “fat-tailed” risks. Millner (2013) scrutinizes the implications
of the dismal theorem and proposes an alternative framework in which the contribution of
catastrophes to welfare loss is dampened. Pindyck and Wang (2013) use a general equilib-
rium model of production, capital accumulation, and household preferences to assess how
much society should spend on reducing the probability and impact of a climate catastrophe.
1Key words and journals included in the bibliometric analysis appear in the Appendix. Note that our
analysis includes all kinds of catastrophic events including natural disasters and climate change, but also
warfare and financial crises.
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Figure 1: Economists’ growing interest in catastrophes and disasters
Notes: Bibliometric search of the WEB OF SCIENCE™ with the key words <catastrophe>, <catastrophes>,
<catastrophic>, <disaster>, <disasters>, or <disastrous>; hits are articles published in selected economics
journals between 1974 and 2014.
Barro (2015) shows that optimal investment in climate change mitigation increases with both
social risk aversion and the probability and size of catastrophes. Most recently, Martin and
Pindyck (2015) analyze the limits of CBA to deal with multiple catastrophe risks.
What do all of the above contributions to climate economics have in common? Start-
ing from the premise of a representative agent who seeks to maximize expected utility over
uncertain consumption paths, they model catastrophe risk in essentially the same fashion.
As Weitzman (2009: 9) puts it: “The basic idea is that a society trading o  a decreased
probability of its own catastrophic demise against the cost of lowering the probability of that
catastrophe is facing a decision problem conceptually analogous to how a person might make
a tradeo  between decreased consumption as against a lower probability of that person’s own
individually catastrophic end.” Since economists deal with catastrophe risks just like they
deal with ordinary consumption risks, they also presume that society should be catastrophe
averse in the very same way the representative agent is risk averse with regard to aggre-
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gated consumption. The sanctity of the representative agent in climate-economic models is
highlighted by the discussion of Weitzman’s dismal theorem, which has centered on the lim-
itations of the proposed constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function (Nordhaus
2011; Pindyck 2011; Millner 2013; Arrow and Priebsch 2014; Horowitz and Lange 2014).
In this paper we introduce an alternative framework, which conceptualizes catastrophes
as social risks that have a small likelihood of many people dying (or, more generally, facing
a loss) together. The key aspect here is the coincidence of many deaths, because the social
planner in our framework cares about the total number of fatalities in each state of the world.
In other words, our focus is on population risk. We characterize the catastrophic potential
of a risk by the spread in the distribution of fatalities within the threatened population. Our
main objective then is to explore conceivable attitudes toward catastrophe risks. We focus on
threats to life and limb mostly because the expected number of lives saved is the prevailing
benefit measure of policies designed to avoid climate catastrophes, or nuclear accidents, or
terrorist attacks. The expectancy criterion fails, however, to account for society’s desire to
avoid catastrophes. Let us illustrate this claim by the following example.
The U.S. President and Vice President do not travel together, in order to avoid a
“decapitation strike”, i.e. the possibility of the simultaneous deaths of the commander-
in-chief and his second-in-command. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to presume
that, when traveling with his family, the President should take the same plane to reduce
the prospect of bereavement. In a seminal paper on the value of life, Schelling (1968: 156)
noted that: “If a family of four must fly, and has a choice among four aircraft, of which it
is known that one is defective but not known which one, it should be possible to persuade
them to fly together. The prospects of each individual’s survival are the same, no matter
how they divide themselves among the aircraft, but the prospects for bereavement are nearly
eliminated through the correlation of their prospects. Society’s interest, in support of the
family’s interest, should be to see that they are permitted and encouraged to take the same
plane together.”
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A related thought experiment, but in the environmental context and involving many
more lives, has been put forward by Sunstein (2007: 135): “[C]onsider three stylized envi-
ronmental problems, creating three quite di erent sorts of risks: The first problem creates
a 999,999 in a million chance that no one will die, and a one in a million chance that 200
million people will die. The second problem creates a 50% chance that no one will die and
a 50% chance that 400 people will die. The third problem creates a 100% chance that 200
people will die. Suppose that the government can eliminate all three problems at a specified
cost.” Although in all of the three problems the expected loss amounts to 200 lives, Sunstein
suggests to prioritize the most catastrophic problem. In particular, he argues that the social
cost of losing 200 million people (about two-thirds of the U.S. population) is much higher
than a million times the social cost of losing 200 people and, therefore, warrants a modi-
fied version of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that weights catastrophic losses. He also worries
that the first problem may in fact receive the lowest priority in many decision-making con-
texts, and concludes that to “the extent that many people show little concern about global
warming, part of the explanation may well lie in the fact that human beings often neglect
low-probability, high-harm risks” (Sunstein 2007: 138).
The above examples illustrate that, depending on the context, one may or may not
prefer the situation that gives rise to the possibility of simultaneous deaths. This prompts
two important questions: How do we behave in the face of a looming catastrophe? And
how should we behave in order to optimally protect ourselves against catastrophes? In
the remainder of the paper, we collect insights from decision theory, behavioral economics,
psychology, social choice, political economy, and risk management studies to reflect upon
these questions. We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we provide a formal definition of what
we mean by catastrophe risk. We make use of this definition to introduce di erent attitudes
toward catastrophe that express preferences over the frequency and size of adverse outcomes.
In Section 3 we present a review and discussion of empirical studies that explore how people
make decisions in the face of catastrophes. Section 4 provides a summary of the social choice
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approach to evaluate risky social situations. Against this theoretical background, in Section
5 we look at what regulators actually do when they manage catastrophe risks. Section 6
summarizes the main points of our analysis.
2 Definition of Catastrophe Risk
The term catastrophe has a di erent meaning for di erent people. This is true both in
general and in economics. For the sake of clarity, we start with a precise definition of what
we mean by catastrophe risk. The definition is consequentialist, focusing solely on the number
of fatalities. It characterizes catastrophes as a “bunching of fatalities”, without specifying
whether the bunching arises from a common cause, or among an identified group of people,
or at the same time, or in the same place (Lathrop 1982). In our framework, individuals
are identical so that the identity of victims and survivors does not matter. Our definition
does not attempt a sharp distinction between catastrophic and common risks. Instead, we
consider all possible distributions of fatalities pertaining to one risky situation and propose
a criterion to rank the distributions in terms of how relatively catastrophic they are. More
precisely, we compare social risks based on the spread in the distribution of fatalities, and
thus keep the expected number of fatalities constant across the compared situations.
Consider a population of i = 1, ..., N individuals, each of whom faces the probability
of dying pi œ [0, 1] due to a particular cause. The risk of death is modeled as a Bernoulli
random variable x˜i which takes on the value 1 if individual i dies, and 0 otherwise. We are
interested in the distribution of fatalities across the population at risk: d˜ := qNi=1 x˜i. We
define a more catastrophic distribution of fatalities—that is a more catastrophic risk—based
on the notion of second-order stochastic dominance (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970).2
Definition 1. A distribution of fatalities d˜ is more catastrophic than another distribution
d˜Õ if, for any concave function f(·), E[f(d˜)] = qNk=0 fikf(k) Æ E[f(d˜Õ)] = qNk=0 fiÕkf(k), where
2We note that our definition of catastrophe risk is similar to Fishburn and Sarin’s (1991) definition of ex
post risk equity.
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fik and fiÕk denote the probabilities of observing k = 0, 1, ..., N deaths.
By Definition 1, d˜ is a mean-preserving spread (MPS) of d˜Õ and therefore second-order
stochastically dominated by d˜Õ. Accordingly, we define three distinct attitudes toward catas-
trophe risk.
Definition 2. Catastrophe aversion is a preference for the less catastrophic distribution d˜Õ or,
equivalently, for a mean-preserving contraction in the distribution of fatalities. Catastrophe
acceptance is the reversed preference for the more catastrophic distribution d˜ or, equivalently,
in favor of a MPS in the distribution of fatalities. Catastrophe neutrality implies indi erence
between d˜ and d˜Õ.
Definition 2 is consistent with Keeney’s (1980a) seminal work on catastrophe avoidance.3 In
fact, our definition is more general as Keeney only considered binary distributions in which
one outcome is zero fatalities.
Let us now revisit the Presidential travel example to illustrate what we mean by a more
catastrophic distribution.
Example 1. Assume the U.S. President and Vice President need to attend the same cere-
mony to which they travel either together or separately. Let us presume that the likelihood
of a plane crash, and therefore the probability of dying, is p. There are but two admissible
distributions of deaths: if they travel together, either both stay alive or both die (with a
chance fi2 = p); in case they travel separately, there is some chance fiÕ1 = 2p(1 ≠ p) that
one of them dies in a plane crash, and a very small chance fiÕ2 = p2 that both die in two
di erent plane crashes. Moreover, chances are higher that no one dies if they travel together
fi0 = 1 ≠ p > fiÕ0 = (1 ≠ p)2. Figure 2 shows the two admissible distributions of deaths as
probability trees. Catastrophe averse (accepting) preferences imply that one prefers the two
leaders to travel separately (together).
3Keeney was not the first to allude to society’s fear of catastrophic events. In the 1970s, nuclear engineers
started to argue that society’s apparent acceptance of daily hazards and its concern for possibly catastrophic
hazards suggests catastrophe aversion. The argument was based on the idea that a consistent relationship
exists between the severity and frequency of fatal accidents that would somehow reflect social attitudes toward
risk (Starr 1969).
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Figure 2: Presidential travel example
Let us clarify the di erence between the MPS definition of catastrophe risk and an
alternative definition based on the mean-variance rule of modern portfolio theory. The latter
definition implies that catastrophe aversion is equivalent to preferring the less variable of
two distributions with identical expected loss in terms of the number of fatalities: d˜Õ º d˜ if
E[d˜] = E[d˜Õ] and var[d˜] > var[d˜Õ]. It is immediate that a more catastrophic distribution in the
sense of a MPS must have a greater variance. The converse is not true, however. This is
because the variance induces a complete ordering, while a MPS gives rise to a partial ordering
only. The MPS criterion is therefore stronger than the increasing variance criterion.
An important point to raise is that catastrophe aversion implies, but is not implied
by, preferences for minimizing the maximum probable loss. While at odds with common
justifications for catastrophe aversion (Peterson 2002), this non-equivalence reflects an intu-
itive principle: what matters to a catastrophe averse decision maker when comparing two
distributions of fatalities is not only the likelihood of the worst possible outcome, but also
that of the second worst, third worst, etc.4 Our conception of catastrophe aversion can be
directly applied to address questions such as: “How should a single accident that takes N
lives be weighted relative to N accidents, each of which takes a single life?” (Slovic et al.
4In risky situations involving only two individuals, minimax, minimal variance, and catastrophe averse
preferences are strictly equivalent (Bernard et al. 2015).
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1984: 464). Indeed, within our framework the question is formally interpreted as a decision
between the sum of N i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables, i.e. qNi=1 x˜i, versus N times one
single Bernoulli random variable, i.e. Nx˜i. According to Definition 1, the latter distribution
is more catastrophic than the former, and preferences are determined by the decision maker’s
attitude toward catastrophe risk.
3 Catastrophe Risk and Empirical Social Choices
We now turn to the available evidence on attitudes toward catastrophe risk. Below, we
provide a summary of empirical studies that put subjects in the shoes of a social planner and
ask them to make risky choices a ecting other people.
3.1 Risky Social Choices involving Lives
We start with evidence arising from survey studies in which subjects evaluate risky social
situations involving human lives. Let us stress a number of limitations beforehand. First
and foremost, these studies are hypothetical by necessity. Decisions involving possibly many
fatalities cannot be incentivized in the same way that economic experiments typically are.
Second, the perspective of a social planner is unusual for most people and their decisions are
thus prone to various heuristics and biases as explored in the psychometric risk literature.
Third, subjects are typically asked to consider the problem in isolation and to ignore the
social cost of their decisions. In light of these limitations, we agree with the reader that the
generalizability of these survey studies is limited. Nonetheless, they provide a good starting
point. The general picture that emerges from our summary is striking and perhaps, surprising
as most studies summarized in Table 1 provide evidence in favor of catastrophe accepting
attitudes.
We proceed by reviewing various types of risky social choices that have been used to
elicit subjects’ attitudes toward catastrophe risk. We emphasize that most problems involve
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Figure 3: Risky social decision problem: standard gamble
“life or death” prospects to fewer than 1,000 individuals. The term “catastrophe” is thus used
in the technical sense of Definition 1, rather than in the colloquial sense of an apocalyptic
threat.
Standard gambles. Probably the most famous risky social choice problem is Tversky
and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian disease problem, which can be illustrated as standard gamble
as in Figure 3. As the original problem was designed to detect preference reversals, there
exists a loss framing and a gain framing (in square brackets):
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume
that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program
C [A] is adopted, 400 [200] people will die [be saved]. If Program D [B] is adopted, there is 1/3
probability that nobody [600 people] will die [be saved], and 2/3 probability that 600 people [no
people] will die [be saved]. Which of the two programs would you favor?
Tversky and Kahneman found strong evidence against catastrophe aversion when the framing
emphasized the number of deaths (78% of subject preferred program D to C) and strong
evidence for catastrophe aversion when the framing emphasized the number of lives saved
(72% of subjects preferred program A to B).
Dozens of replication studies have confirmed that people are consistently more risk
seeking (averse) in the loss (gain) domain (Kuehberger 1998). In a noteworthy study, Olivola
and Sagara (2009) manipulated responses to the Asian disease problem by showing subjects
di erently shaped distributions of mortality-causing events beforehand. The results suggest
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that distributions of event-related death tolls which people observe in their daily lives govern
the evaluation of lifesaving interventions and risk preferences concerning them.
Another important study on risky social choices was devised by Fischho  (1983). Pre-
suming that the natural way of framing such decision problems is to emphasize the loss of
life, he explored preferences over catastrophe risk by varying both the loss of lives and the
corresponding probability in a systematic way. A large majority of subjects (70% and more)
chose the probabilistic option across all of Fischho ’s treatments, providing strong evidence
for catastrophe accepting preferences. In a similar vein, Slovic et al. (1984) asked several
hundred students whether they would rather reduce the frequency of single-fatality accidents
or of large-scale accidents involving 300 deaths. More than 70% of their subjects preferred
reducing the frequency of single-fatality accidents, even though reducing the frequency of
large-scale accidents implied a 10%-reduction in the expected number of fatalities.
The only standard-gamble study that found some support for catastrophe averse pref-
erences asked subjects whether society should rather sacrifice one (anonymous) individual
in exchange for the survival of a group of 99 individuals, or accept that each of the 100
individuals faces a 1/100 probability to die (Hammerton et al. 1982).5 One hundred of the
118 subjects approved of the sacrifice. Later replications by Keller and Sarin (1988) did,
however, not confirm the original result (42 out of 53 subjects preferred the gamble).
Paired gambles. In this type of decision problem, subjects choose between two risky
options. Keller and Sarin (1988) framed paired-gamble problems in the following way:
There are 100 islanders who are susceptible to a specific fatal disease which has recently appeared
on the mainland. [...] All susceptible people must be injected with the serum within 24 hours,
or each will have a 15% chance of contracting the disease and eventually dying. There is no
time to acquire more serum. There are only 3000 milligrams of the serum available. As the
public health o cer, it is your job to choose between the following options: A) Give the same
low dose of 30 milligrams of serum to all 100 susceptible islanders. 50 of those susceptible are
northerners, 50 are southerners. Each susceptible person will have an independent 10% chance
5Individuals’ risk of dying was described as independent so that there was only a tiny probability (10≠20)
of 100 deaths, but a significant probability (0.264) of observing two or more deaths.
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Figure 4: Risky social decision problem: paired gamble
of dying. The expected number of deaths is 10; B) Divide up the available serum among the
50 northerners who are susceptible to the disease. Thus, these people will receive a higher 60
milligram dose. Each of the 50 will now have an independent 5% chance of dying. Since the
50 susceptible southerners will receive none of the serum, each will still have a 15% chance of
dying by contracting this disease. The expected number of deaths is 10.
All but one of the 53 subjects chose option A, which is a MPS of option B. In Figure 4 we
divide the population at risk by 50 to illustrate that the problem is one of either splitting
a scarce resource among two individuals so that common fates become more likely (option
A), or of favoring one individual over the other so that there is more likelihood of only one
fatality (option B). Keller and Sarin used several paired gambles of this type, all pointing
to catastrophe accepting preferences. Hubert et al. (1991) used a di erent paired-gamble
method. In their study, a sample of 22 high-ranking French public administrators indicated
the probabilities that would make them indi erent to either 100-fatalities or 1,000-fatalities
accidents and a 1/10 chance of a 10-fatalities accident. The results indicate strong catastrophe
aversion. Yet the findings have to be interpreted with caution as they rely on a sample of
subjects who are responsible for local safety and may therefore consider additional decision
constraints.
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Two recent studies by Abrahamsson and Johansson (2006) and by Rheinberger (2010)
extend the paired-gamble approach, using the gamble-tradeo  method (Wakker and Dene e
1986). The gamble-tradeo  method is a chained utility elicitation protocol, which requires
subjects to equalize two risky gambles by stating an indi erence value. The stated value is
then used as reference value in the next elicitation step so that one ends up with a sequence
of outcomes that are equally spaced in utility units. Based on the assumption of a CRRA-
disutility function over the number of lives lost, f(d) = d“, the two studies estimate the
subject-specific coe cient of relative risk aversion “ˆ. In both studies, the majority of subjects
made choices implying catastrophe accepting preferences; i.e., “ˆ < 1.
Discrete choices. A straightforward extension of paired gambles is to vary the frequency
and severity of accidents systematically in a series of di erent combinations of scenarios
from which subjects choose the preferred one. The result is a discrete choice experiment
(DCE) with options that may be phrased as alternative safety policies. Itaoka et al. (2006)
conducted such a DCE to examine the influence of risk characteristics involved in fossil fuel
and nuclear power generation, on willingness to pay for the reduction of mortality risks.
The attributes to describe nuclear risks included the probability of a catastrophic accident
and the corresponding expected loss of lives. The authors found evidence of catastrophe
aversion, meaning that subjects focused on the conditional loss from a nuclear accident, not
its probability. In contrast, Rheinberger (2010) found no indication of catastrophe aversion
in a DCE that was specifically designed to examine the tradeo  between the number of road
fatalities and the frequency of accidents. In a random utility framework, he estimated a
structural model of preferences over catastrophe risk, assuming CRRA-type risk preferences.
The estimated coe cient of relative risk aversion is well below unity (“ˆ = 0.84), suggesting
that subjects put distinctly more weight on the frequency of accidents than on the number
of deaths.
Ordinal choices. The functional choice of the CRRA-disutility function can be related
to a fundamental psychophysical principle known as Weber’s law. This principle states that
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people react with diminishing sensitivity to steady increments in a stimulus. In an influential
study, Fetherstonehaugh et al. (1997) applied the principle to lifesaving interventions and
found that subjects were largely insensitive to the number of lives saved against a background
of increasing numbers of lives at risk. Fetherstonehaugh and co-authors suggest a form of
“psychophysical numbing” to explain the inability to appreciate losses of life as they become
more catastrophic. In economic terms this insensitivity implies that the marginal utility of
saving an additional life decreases and may even become negative (Västfjäll et al. 2015).
In a di erent set up, Jones-Lee and Loomes (1995) studied the perceived transportation
safety in London’s Underground railway system. Two hundred and twenty-two subjects as-
sessed the following statement on an ordinal ranking scale ranging from <strongly disagree>
to <strongly agree>:
25-30 deaths in a single Underground accident is worse than 25-30 deaths in separate Under-
ground accidents.
Only 20% of the subjects agreed that the single accident was worse, while 67% thought sep-
arate accidents were worse. Having expressed their preferences over di erent transportation
risks, subjects were then asked to assume that a specific safety budget had to be allocated
to reducing fatalities either from large-scale accidents or from small-scale ones. A minority
of 23% preferred investing in the reduction of catastrophic accidents. Carlsson et al. (2012)
did a similar study on tra c safety in Sweden, surveying both members of the general public
and public administrators, and found that the expressed risk preferences were more nuanced.
While members of the general public preferred the avoidance of frequent single-fatality acci-
dents over the avoidance of infrequent large-scale ones, there was no clear preference among
public administrators. Roughly 40% of them preferred avoiding either large-scale or small-
scale accidents, while the remaining 20% said they had no preference for either one of the
prospects.
We conclude that the findings from empirical social choice studies involving multiple-
fatality risks are somewhat blurry. Nevertheless, they suggest that the majority of study
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participants—mostly Americans or Europeans—do not want regulators to adopt catastrophe
averse policies when it comes to risks to life and limb.
3.2 Risky Social Choices involving Financial Stakes
So far, we have looked at studies that elicit preferences over risks involving human lives.
We will now summarize the key findings of lab experiments that explore other-regarding
preferences in risky choices over financial gambles. Of course, preferences revealed in such
gambles are di erent from those involving human lives, as is the decision context. So while
these studies are not informative about attitudes toward catastrophe risk in the narrow sense,
they are properly incentivized and may therefore reveal dimensions of social risk attitudes
that cannot be elicited by hypothetical choices.
Existing studies focus on three issues: ex ante fairness, ex post outcomes, and attitudes
toward social risks and in particular toward the correlation between one subject’s prospects
and the prospects of the other subjects. Evidence on correlation attitudes is relevant because
it tells us whether or not subjects prefer to win/lose simultaneously.
Lotteries. One way to study correlation attitudes in risky choices is by means of lottery
tasks in which social context plays a role. Several such studies have recently been conducted.
Rohde and Rohde (2011) analyze how individuals’ decisions under risk depend on risks that
others face in the same environment. Their results suggest that people prefer risks in the gain
domain to be independent rather than correlated. Friedl et al. (2014) look at the take-up of
insurance for correlated and uncorrelated risk and find that the average willingness-to-pay for
insurance is significantly higher for the latter type of risk. This suggests that people prefer
risks in the loss domain to be correlated rather than independent. Linde and Sonnemans
(2012) and Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015) zoom in on peer e ects in risky choices and find
that risk attitudes are a ected by concerns for relative payo : subjects are more risk averse
in situations in which they can earn at the most as much as their peers than they are in
situations in which they will earn at least as much. Harrison et al. (2013) explore yet
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another aspect of social risk. They elicit individual and group risk attitudes using multiple
price lists and find them to be highly correlated.
Dictator games. Konow (2000), Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010), Brock et al. (2013), and
López-Vargas (2014) present evidence from probabilistic Dictator games.6 A significant share
of subjects in all of these studies exhibit preferences for ex ante equal chances, highlighting
that fairness and equity preferences matter in risky choices. Brock et al. (2013) note, how-
ever, that preferences based exclusively on ex ante or ex post comparisons cannot generate
the empirical patterns they observe. Even with regard to attitudes toward social risks there
is no clear evidence that individuals avoid negatively correlated risks more often than posi-
tively correlated risks. Ex post fairness in outcomes would predict that people strictly prefer
positively correlated gambles. López-Vargas (2014) finds that subjects take substantially
more risk when outcomes are fairly distributed ex post, but experiments by Brennan et al.
(2008) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) do not support this result.
Public goods games. Milinski et al. (2008) initiated a wave of experiments that ex-
plored the conditions under which people cooperate to avoid catastrophic outcomes. In their
experiment, six players are endowed with Ä40. The game stretches over ten periods, in each
of which players decide how much they want to contribute to the avoidance of a climate
catastrophe. Players have no means to communicate and therefore cannot coordinate. The
“catastrophe” is averted with certainty if at least Ä120 are raised at the end of the game. In
that case, each player receives the amount of money he or she has left. Otherwise, players face
the collective risk p = 0.9 of losing everything, which implies perfectly correlated financial
risks. There exist two symmetric pure strategy equilibriums: players contribute Ä0 in every
period, yielding an expected payo  of Ä4 to each player; or players contribute Ä2 in every
period, yielding everyone a certain payo  of Ä20. Only half of the ten participating groups
reached the e cient equilibrium. Replications by Tavoni et al. (2011) and Barrett and Dan-
6In these games, two players face a coin-flip risk between prospects A and B. For example, both prospects
may pay either $5 or $50 but outcomes are positively or negatively correlated. Using obvious notations, we
have: A : 12 (5, 5)ü 12 (50, 50) vs B : 12 (5, 50)ü 12 (50, 5). If player 1 dislikes both unequal outcomes and risk,
she will prefer prospect A over prospect B although she faces the same personal risk under both prospects.
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nenberg (2012) found that communication between the players dramatically increased the
success in raising the target amount.
In terms of attitudes toward catastrophe risks, the results of public goods games are
more di cult to interpret than those of lotteries or dictator games, for the measurement
of risk preferences is confounded by the strategic nature of the game—the avoidance of the
catastrophe is also the e cient equilibrium.
3.3 Behavioral Explanations
Several behavioral factors might explain the patterns emerging from the empirical studies
reviewed above. In this section we briefly visit some of them. Note that we are not suggesting
that the presented explanations are either exhaustive or mutually exclusive.
Risk perception and emotions. Subjects in the above studies evaluated risky social
situations in their context. It is well-known that this context is shaped by the attention that
society gives to various threats (Kasperson et al. 1988) and that catastrophes are produced
and consumed by society in the sense that some risks receive much more attention than
others (Zeckhauser 1996). Dread, outrage and other negative feelings determine how risks
are perceived (Slovic 1987; Slovic et al. 2000). It is therefore of little surprise that Itaoka et al.
(2006) found strong evidence for catastrophe aversion in choices that involved a catastrophic
nuclear accident, a rare hazard over which the individual has little control, while Rheinberger
(2010) found catastrophe acceptance in choices over road accidents, an everyday hazard over
which the individual has significant control. These findings coincide with the risk-as-feelings
hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. 2001), which contends that people evaluate risks both at a
cognitive level (i.e., based on the probability and desirability of the associated consequences)
and an emotional level (i.e., based on feelings), but that emotional reactions to risks can
diverge from cognitive evaluations of the same risks as their determinants di er.
Ambiguity aversion. It has been suggested that the dread dimension of some risks is
cognitively related to the ambiguity dimension of rare events (Hsu et al. 2005). If one does
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not know the probabilities of outcomes, it seems natural to focus on worst-case consequences
(Ellsberg 1961). While the prospects in the studies reviewed above are all described in terms
of objective probabilities, a mental association between the small likelihood of a catastrophe
and the attitude toward ambiguous probabilities seems possible. However, experimental
studies have found ambiguity-seeking behavior to prevail in the loss domain and for unlikely
events (Wakker 2010; Kocher et al. 2015). Hence, it is not clear at all whether one would
find ambiguity aversion or rather ambiguity seeking when analyzing attitudes toward climate
change and other environmental catastrophes—just as the studies reviewed above found more
evidence for catastrophe acceptance than for catastrophe aversion.
Inequity aversion. One such reaction that pervades through the evaluation of life and
death prospects is that people dislike “dooming” some individuals. That is, they are ex post
inequity averse. In this respect the study by Keller and Sarin (1988) is particularly insightful.
Subjects were asked not only about their preferred option but also about the fairer option,
and the answers they received were almost perfectly correlated, suggesting that people chose
what they deemed morally defensible. Their preferences seem to be linked to anticipated
feelings such as guilt, remorse and regret, that might diminish the decision maker’s utility
after the realization of the risk (Battigalli and Dufwenberger 2007; Ellingsen et al. 2010).
Salience and immediacy e ects. Subjects’ evaluations of social risks are likely to be
a ected by salience and immediacy e ects. Risks that subjects have never experienced before
(as is likely for low-probability, large-loss events) are assessed di erently from those just
experienced or from those witnessed frequently. For instance, Huang et al. (2013) found
that, after the Fukushima accident, people living close to a nuclear power plant in China
perceived the risk of a nuclear accident as being much higher, and the acceptability of that
risk as being much lower. The salience hypothesis is consistent with a process-level model
of magnitude evaluation, based on memory sampling and relative judgment that does not
rely on stable value representations to explain attitudes toward catastrophe risks (Olivola and
Sagara 2009). Alternatively, the salience hypothesis is also consistent with context-dependent
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choice models that presume decision makers are risk seeking when a prospect’s upside is more
salient, and risk averse when its downside is more salient (Bordalo et al. 2012).
Probability weighting. It is well documented that people weight probabilities when faced
with gambles over money stakes. For example, Bruhin et al. (2010) analyzed almost 18,000
decisions over gambles involving real monetary gains and losses and found that roughly 80% of
their 448 subjects exhibited significant deviations from linear probability weighting. Although
probabilities were known to subjects of the reviewed empirical choice studies, there is little
reason to believe that probability weighting would not a ect the choices made. First, subjects
may distort given probabilities when making choices due to decision weighting (as in prospect
theory). Second they may not believe in the announced probabilities and may replace them
by subjective probabilities. The commonly observed pattern of probability weighting is best
modeled by an inverse S-shaped function (Prelec 1998), and there is some evidence suggesting
that the same pattern also applies to life and death prospects (Rheinberger 2010). If that
were the case, the empirical evidence should tend to favor catastrophe aversion since small
probabilities are typically inflated. This suggests that probability weighting either does not
apply in choices over life and death prospects, or—more probable to us—is dominated by
other psychological factors.
Psychophysical numbing. The psychophysical numbing hypothesis (Fetherstonehaugh et
al. 1997) is a direct explanation for why people do not exhibit catastrophe averse preferences
in life and death prospects. Reasons invoked for the diminished sensitivity to the value of life
include: (i) people’s inability to emotionally appreciate the loss of lives in absolute numbers
(Slovic 2007); (ii) a form of motivation crowding-out in which knowing the number of lives
one cannot save reduces the utility of helping (Västfjäll et al. 2015); and (iii) the disparity
in the valuation of identified versus statistical victims (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997; Small
and Loewenstein 2003). All of these reasons may actually explain why the social disutility
derived from an accident in which 1,000 people die might be less than 10 times the social
disutility from another accident claiming 100 lives.
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Framing e ects. The empirical evidence on attitudes toward catastrophe risk is subject
to various framing e ects (see Kuehberger et al. 1999). The Asian disease problem illustrates
that one important e ect relates to whether consequences are framed as lives lost or saved.
Interestingly, when Druckman (2001) modified the original problem to:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die and 200 people will be saved. If Program D is
adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 600 people will be saved, and 2/3
probability that 600 people will die and no people will be saved. Which of the two programs
would you favor?
43% of subjects chose the catastrophe averse option C, which is approximately mid-way
between the results he found for the gain framing (68.1%) and the loss framing (22.8%).
Other framing e ects are known to play a role in decisions under risk, and perhaps even
more so in risky social situations. Stewart et al. (2003) show that the set of available options
has a large e ect on choices under risk. This suggests that many people value prospects
relative to one another, which gets support from the psychophysical numbing hypothesis.
Accountability has also been shown to a ect preferences over life and death prospects. For
example, subjects in Rheinberger (2010) declared in debriefing questions that the social
planner should be held accountable for multiple small-scale accidents, while rare large-scale
accidents were rationalized as random acts.
In sum, the results of empirical social choice studies are consistent with various ef-
fects found in psychometric risk research. However, it is not clear which of the e ects are
predominant in explaining the observed attitudes toward catastrophe risks.
4 Catastrophe Risk and Social Choice Theory
The above summary of empirical social choice studies suggests a number of behavioral mo-
tives that might a ect society’s attitudes toward catastrophe. In this section, we turn our
attention to normative models and explain how various risk attitudes can be grounded in
social choice theory. The social choice approach is most popular among philosophers and
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economists. It typically puts forward a set of axioms and explores their logical implications.
This immediately raises a thorny question: Who decides about the axioms that society ought
to adopt? The intuition of philosophers and economists might be poor guidance for collective
decision making. Relying instead on real choices such as those made in ballots does not seem
very useful either, since existing policies and political institutions tell us little about the de-
sirability of specific axioms. Experimental economics could be useful here, but experimental
outcomes are often plagued by the self-serving bias, and it is di cult to properly measure
social fairness concerns in the lab (Johansson-Stenman and Konow 2010). One could rely on
stated preferences instead, but applying ethical theories is often complex, and it is unclear
how one should elicit lay people’s opinions about the desirability of technical axioms in any
informative way. Balancing these issues, we decided simply to present the most important
axioms pertaining to catastrophe risks, and to leave it to the reader to judge their appeal for
policymaking.
4.1 Social Welfare Functions
Social choice theory and cognate disciplines have a long-standing interest in attitudes toward
risk. In his aggregation theorem, Harsanyi (1955) proposed that the social planner should
maximize the sum of individual utilities as if individuals would maximize expected utility
under a veil of ignorance (i.e., without knowing their identity). Utilitarianism has, however,
been widely contested, for it is indi erent to both ex ante and ex post inequalities in the
distribution of outcomes.7 A number of alternative social welfare functions (SWFs) have
been proposed to capture concerns for the worse-o  in the evaluation of risky social situations
(Bovens and Fleurbaey 2012). In the context of mortality risk, Adler et al. (2014) examined
the most popular SWFs with respect to sensitivity to wealth and baseline risk, equal value
of risk reduction, preference for risk equity and catastrophe aversion, and compared them
to welfare assessments based on the standard CBA framework. Below, we illustrate some of
7Prominent criticism includes that of Diamond (1967), Sen (1970), Myerson (1981), Broome (1984),
Epstein and Segal (1992), Ben-Porath et al. (1997), and Fleurbaey (2010).
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these results using the canonical example of Diamond (1967).
Example 2. Consider three risky social situations S = A,B, C, in which individuals i = 1, 2
face the risk of dying. They face two equiprobable states j = head, tail (where j is determined
by a coin toss). The state-dependent individual utilities uij associated with each situation
are represented by the following outcome matrices:
A : j=head
j=tail
i=1 i=2SWWU 1 1
0 0
TXXV vs. B : j=head
j=tail
i=1 i=2SWWU 1 0
0 1
TXXV vs. C : j=head
j=tail
i=1 i=2SWWU 1 0
1 0
TXXV .
Situation A implies the most catastrophic risk, while situations B and C induce the same
distribution of fatalities. Situation B is ex post unequal as in each state one individual dies
while the other one stays alive. Situation C is ex ante and ex post unequal as individual 2 is
going to die and individual 1 stays alive no matter whether the coin lands on head or tail.
Example 2 highlights the apparent conflicts between fairness considerations and social
risk assessment in general (Fishburn and Sarin 1991; 1994; Gajdos et al. 2010) and between
catastrophe avoidance and risk equity concerns (Keeney 1980a; 1980b; Fishburn 1984; Bom-
mier and Zuber 2008) in particular. Lichtenstein et al. (1990: 99) conclude that “one can
achieve only one of the apparently laudable but inconsistent goals of fatality minimization,
risk equity, and catastrophe avoidance”. How do common SWFs handle these conflicting
goals?
• Utilitarian SWF: WU(S) =
Nq
i=1
Mq
j=1
pjuij for persons i = 1, ..., N , states j = 1, ...,M , and
statewise utility uij. Applied to Example 2 we have WU(A) = WU(B) = WU(C) = 1,
demonstrating that the utilitarian SWF is catastrophe and inequity neutral.
• Ex ante prioritarian SWFs: WEAP (S) =
Nq
i=1
Ï
A
Mq
j=1
pjuij
B
for persons i = 1, ..., N , states
j = 1, ...,M , statewise utility uij, and a strictly concave function Ï. Applied to Example
2 we have WEAP (A) = WEAP (B) = 2Ï(1/2) > WEAP (C) = Ï(1) +Ï(0), demonstrating
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that ex ante prioritarian SWFs are catastrophe neutral, but exhibit ex ante inequity
aversion.
• Ex post prioritarian SWFs: WEPP (S) =
Mq
j=1
pj
Nq
i=1
Ï(uij) for persons i = 1, ..., N ,
states j = 1, ...,M , statewise utility uij, and a strictly concave function Ï. Applied to
Example 2 we have WEPP (A) = WEPP (B) = WEPP (C) = Ï(1) +Ï(0), showing that ex
post prioritarian SWFs result in the same preferential order as utilitarianism.
The above results demonstrate that common SWFs are catastrophe neutral; i.e., they do
not distinguish between situations A and B. Environmental economists should raise an
eyebrow here, because policy evaluation is typically based on a utilitarian SWF, implying
that popular integrated assessment models of climate change (e.g., DICE, RICE, FUND,
PAGE) are catastrophe neutral! So let us turn to recent SWF approaches that do allow for
social attitudes toward catastrophe to be captured.
• Ex post transformed SWFs: WEPT (S) =
Mq
j=1
pj„
AA
Nq
i=1
Ï(uij)
B
/N
B
for persons i =
1, ..., N , states j = 1, ...,M , statewise utility uij, and a strictly concave function Ï. The
transformation function „ may be linear, concave, or convex. Applied to Example 2 we
obtain WEPT (A) = 0.5„(Ï(1)) + 0.5„(Ï(0)) and WEPT (B) = WEPT (C) = „(0.5Ï(1) +
0.5Ï(0)), so that preferences are catastrophe accepting (averse) if and only if „ is convex
(concave). One noteworthy transformation is the equally distributed equivalent (EDE)
proposed by Fleurbaey (2010), which is obtained by setting „ = Ï≠1 (where „ is convex
by the concavity of Ï). When applied to Example 2, the EDE results in catastrophe
accepting attitudes toward social risk and neutrality toward ex ante inequity.
• Catastrophe sensitive (CS) SWFs: WCS(S)
Mq
j=1
1
Á(1 ≠
Nr
i=1
(1 ≠ Áuij)) for persons i =
1, ..., N , states j = 1, ...,M , statewise utility uij, and the constraint Áuij < 1. When
applying the CS-SWF proposed by Bommier and Zuber (2008) to Example 2, we obtain
WCS(A) = 1 ≠ 0.5Á and WCS(B) = WCS(C) = 1. Consequently, attitudes are averse
(accepting) toward catastrophe risk if and only if Á is positive (negative), while they
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are always neutral toward ex ante inequity.
The above examples allow several conclusions to be drawn. First, ex ante approaches are
always catastrophe neutral. Indeed, all that matters under ex ante approaches is individual
expected utility. Therefore, the comparison of the realized levels of individual utility is
irrelevant for welfare assessments. Consequently, ex ante approaches do not care whether
people reach simultaneously high or low utility levels in a specific state. In contrast, ex post
approaches can be catastrophe sensitive. Typically, a social planner who dislikes ex post
inequity will prefer situation A over situations B and C, as only in the first situation are
utility levels equal across states. For that reason, the ex post inequity averse planner is also
said to exhibit common-fate preferences (Schelling 1968).
Not all ex post approaches are catastrophe sensitive, however. As WEPT and WCS
illustrate, the key property that induces sensitivity to the possibility of catastrophe is non-
separability. Many scholars deem non-separability a problematic property because it implies
that the level of utilities of individuals who are una ected by a particular policy might still
matter for the evaluation of that policy. We finally stress that ex post approaches violate the
Pareto principle and have the additional drawback of neutrality toward ex ante inequity.8 We
conclude that allowing for catastrophe sensitive preferences comes at the cost of abandoning
other normatively desirable goals. This conclusion takes us all the way back to the seminal
result of Keeney (1980a), which states that there is always a conflict between ex ante and ex
post risk equity.9 While Keeney’s result tells us nothing about which attitude the decision
maker should exhibit toward catastrophe risk, it highlights the trade-o  that the decision
maker faces if he or she is averse to ex ante risk inequity and to catastrophic outcomes.
8See Fleurbaey (2010: 658) and Bovens and Fleurbaey (2012: 242-243) for a response to these objections.
9One important limitation of Keeney’s theorem is that it assumes individual risks to be statistically
independent. It is possible to relax the independence assumption whenever a risk transfer from the more
exposed to the less exposed person does not decrease the statistical correlation between their risks (Bernard
et al. 2015).
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4.2 Some Implications for Risk Management
What are the implications for risk management of using one or the other SWF? Here, we
begin to theoretically explore how the social planner’s attitudes toward catastrophe can a ect
the level of the collective risk management e ort. Consider a society composed of i = 1, ..., N
homogenous individuals all endowed with initial wealth w. Let the per capita cost of e ort
e to manage a certain risk be c(e) > 0, and the per capita loss due to the realization of this
risk be l(e) > 0. This loss is interpreted as the individual’s utility loss induced by death or
injury, plus any monetary damage associated with the realization of the risk. E ort reduces
the size of damage (lÕ(e) < 0), but is costly (cÕ(e) > 0). Moreover, e ort is increasingly more
costly (cÕÕ(e) > 0) and increasingly less e ective (lÕÕ(e) Ø 0). Hence, agents face a classical
self-insurance problem.
Using the notation introduced in Section 2, each individual’s risk is represented by a
Bernoulli random variable x˜i. This variable takes on the value 1 if the risk materializes,
and 0 otherwise. As a result, individual i derives the (random) utility w ≠ c(e) ≠ x˜il(e)
from the self-insurance e ort e. We are interested in the planner’s attitude toward the
aggregate risk d˜ := qNi=1 x˜i. We first study the optimal social level of e ort under a utilitarian
SWF. The utilitarian social planner maximizes the (unweighted) sum of utilities, namely
Nw≠Nc(e)≠E[d˜]l(e), which yields the optimal e ort eú that solves the first order condition:
≠NcÕ(eú)≠ E[d˜]lÕ(eú) = 0.
Observe that the optimal e ort does not depend on how catastrophic the risk is, since it
depends only on the aggregate risk E[d˜]. In other words, the utilitarian social planner cares
only about the expected size of damage (namely, the expected number of fatalities or injuries),
but not about its distribution.
Let us now turn to a more general class of SWFs, which can display catastrophe ac-
cepting or catastrophe averse preferences. Following the discussion in Section 4.1, we use an
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ex post transformed SWF.10 In this case, the social planner maximizes
E
C
„
A
w ≠ c(e)≠ d˜l(e)
N
BD
,
where „ convex (concave) means catastrophe acceptance (aversion). The maximand is in
general non-separable in individual utilities and can therefore be sensitive to higher order
moments of the aggregate risk d˜. Note also that catastrophe accepting preferences may lead
to a non-concave maximand if „ is su ciently convex. We ignore this (possibly interesting)
complication here and assume that the maximization problem is “well behaved”.
Standard comparative statics techniques can thus be applied. The social planner obvi-
ously shows more self-insurance e ort if he or she has a marginal incentive to increase e ort
compared to the utilitarian e ort eú. Formally, this holds whenever:
E
CA
≠cÕ(eú)≠ d˜l
Õ(eú)
N
B
„Õ
A
w ≠ c(eú)≠ d˜l(e
ú)
N
BD
Ø 0,
which is, by the first order condition under utilitarianism, equal to cov[(≠cÕ(eú)≠ d˜lÕ(eú)N ),„Õ(w≠
c(eú) ≠ d˜l(eú)N )] Ø 0. The term (≠cÕ(eú) ≠ dl
Õ(eú)
N ) always increases in d, while the term
„Õ(w ≠ c(eú) ≠ dl(eú)N ) increases in d if and only if „Õ is decreasing. This is enough to sign
the covariance term, implying the intuitive result that the collective e ort in risk reduction
increases (decreases) when the social planner is catastrophe averse (accepting). Our result
does, however, not imply that the e ort increases when the risk becomes more catastrophic.
For that we would need to show that the function
Ë1
≠cÕ(eú)≠ dl(eú)N
2
„Õ
1
w ≠ c(eú)≠ dl(eú)N
2È
is concave in d, which depends on the third derivative of „. This remark underlines the
richness of the conceptual problem of including attitudes toward catastrophe into optimal
risk management.
The above model is simplistic, of course. The technology of risk reduction is basic
self-insurance. Alternatively, or additionally, one could consider self-protection and risk-
10For the sake of simplicity, we assume WEPT with Ï(x) = x.
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sharing instruments. One could also introduce individual risk averse preferences, or other
forms of catastrophe sensitive SWFs. Finally, one could consider heterogeneous agents in a
multi-period model. All of these extensions are left for future research.
5 Regulatory Approaches to Catastrophe Risk
The question of how catastrophe risks should be regulated is not new, of course. Rising
concerns about large-scale chemical pollution and resource depletion in the 1960s and 1970s
largely contributed to the development of the environmental movement. Environmentalists
have mostly focused on activities that may have catastrophic consequences. As early as 1975,
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission stated (USNRC 1975: 12): “The public appears to
accept more readily a much greater social impact from many small accidents than it does from
the more severe, less frequent occurrences that have a smaller societal impact.” More recently,
the introduction of the precautionary principle into European law and several international
treaties reflect growing concerns over potentially catastrophic environmental risks and the
view that policy making in relation to such risks carries with it a special moral responsibility
(Jonas 1984).
In this section we explore the apparent links between regulatory practice, political
issues, and people’s beliefs and attitudes toward catastrophe. We first summarize the use
of CBA for assessing health and safety policies. We then discuss alternative risk assessment
metrics that are currently used to manage large-scale environmental and industrial risks.
Finally, we take a look at the political economy of risk regulation and the impact that
looming catastrophes have on it.
5.1 Standard Cost-Benefit Analysis
The standard economic approach to evaluate health and safety policies is CBA. So, how does
CBA handle catastrophe risk? Standard CBA quantifies mortality risks in monetary units by
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multiplying the expected number of fatalities by the value of statistical life (VSL), i.e., E[d˜]◊
VSL.11 Accordingly, policy-induced changes in risk have a monetary value that is proportional
to a VSL figure (e.g., the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is currently using a value
of about $8 million per statistical life). Since our definition of catastrophe aversion remains
E[d˜] constant, standard CBA is clearly catastrophe neutral. As an illustration, consider the
monetized benefit of eliminating mortality risk in situations A, B, and C of Example 2.
Remember that as exactly one individual will die in each of the three situations, the value
of a risk-eliminating policy in each situation is just equal to the VSL. There is no premium
whatsoever for eliminating the most catastrophic risk associated with situation A.
It has been argued, however, that we should employ context-specific VSL values (Sun-
stein 2004). Taken to the extreme, this idea would imply the collection of individuals’ WTP
for each specific mortality risk reduction under scrutiny. The outcome of the CBA exercise
would hinge on individual probability changes induced by each project. To illustrate this,
consider again Example 2. When comparing situations A and B, ex ante individual proba-
bilities of dying are equal to 1/2 in both situations. As the risks faced by the two individuals
are identical, there is no reason to justify di erent values for a risk elimination project. Yet,
when we compare situations A and C, we find that ex ante individual probabilities di er
because in situation C one individual is sure to die while the other one bears no risk at all.
One can easily imagine that the former individual’s WTP to eliminate the certainty of his
or her own death is infinite. More generally, policy assessments based on CBA are sensi-
tive to how heterogeneity in individual risks a ects the aggregate WTP for implementing a
risk-reducing project (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996). Previous work has shown that the e ect
depends, among other things, on whether information concerns heterogeneity in baseline risk
or in changes in risk (Armantier and Treich 2004), and whether the valuation is based on
compensating or equivalent variation (Hammitt and Treich 2007).
11The term “value of statistical life” is somewhat controversial (Cameron 2010) and U.K. regulators there-
fore use the term “value of prevented fatality” (VPF) instead. In any case, the metric refers to an individual’s
marginal rate of substitution between income and mortality risk.
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In practice, there are at least two other motives that may justify the representation of
catastrophe attitudes in CBA. The first one relates to the perception of risk. It is conceivable
that people are willing to pay a premium when it comes to avoiding or reducing catastrophe
risks, either because of the small probabilities and large uncertainties associated with such
events (Viscusi 1998, Treich 2010), or because of the horror of widespread deaths as invoked
in popular movies. In his book Catastrophe: Risk and Response‚ Posner (2004) attempts to
estimate the monetary benefit of preventing human extinction in the year 2100. Assuming
a VSL of $28 million and a future population of 12 billion people, he arrives at a tentative
figure of $336 quadrillion. Posner maintains an inflated VSL value precisely to reflect the
horror of extinction. Others have argued that even this 27-digit figure is much too small to
capture the economic value of human extinction (see Bostrom 2013).
The second motive for including catastrophe attitudes into CBA relates to other-
regarding preferences. Remember Schelling’s quote in the introductory section, which men-
tions the prospect of bereavement associated with the possibility of surviving relatives. People
may anticipate tremendous su ering from an inequality that arises after the materialization
of the risk. As we have seen, there is experimental evidence supporting the notion of ex
post inequity aversion. This is not to be confounded with altruistic motives as studied in
the VSL literature (Bergstrom 1982; Jones-Lee 1992). The latter are ex ante concerns and
hence cannot be sensitive to the possibility of a catastrophe. Nonetheless, there is evidence
that other-regarding preferences play a significant role in empirical VSL studies (Hammitt
and Haninger 2010; Gerking et al. 2014), and this leaves open the question of the specific
e ect of catastrophe risk.
5.2 Alternative Approaches
Aside from CBA, two other quantitative criteria are frequently used in environmental and
technical risk assessments: individual risk criteria (IRC) and societal risk criteria (SRC).12 As
12Adler (2005) provides an extensive discussion and critique of di erent environmental risk assessment
approaches.
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their labels suggest, the two criteria relate to di erent dimensions of risk. IRC are concerned
with the distribution of risk across individuals. Known in law as de minimis standards,
they place an upper limit on the “tolerable” or “acceptable” risk of death to individuals and
thereby promote equity in the distribution of risk. SRC, on the other hand, are concerned
with aggregate risk across groups of people. They place limits on the “tolerable” frequency of
adverse outcomes (e.g., fatal accidents) of a specific size. Depending on how the tolerability
criterion is defined, SRC may promote catastrophe aversion or acceptance in decisions over
risky social situations. In the following, we briefly review two ways of implementing SRC in
regulatory frameworks.
FN criterion. The most common way to implement SRC is by means of so-called
Frequency-Number (FN) diagrams that plot the number of fatalities d against the cumulative
frequency of events F (d) that cause d or more deaths, and by a FN-criterion line C(d) that
specifies which risks are deemed tolerable.13 When plotted in double-logarithmic scales as in
Figure 5, risk tolerability is determined by the (negative of the) slope factor “ of a straight
FN-criterion line. A slope factor “ > 1 implies catastrophe averse preferences on behalf of
the regulator.14 Evans and Verlander (1997) demonstrate that adhering to the FN-criterion
is equivalent to a minimax decision rule in which the regulator chooses the policy option j
that fulfills: min
j
max
d
Ó
Fj(d)d“
C(d)
Ô
.
Expected disutility criterion. An alternative SRC can be established based on the tenets
of expected utility theory. Consider a catastrophe averse society and adopt the CRRA-
disutility function over the number of lives lost, f(d) = d“, to model catastrophe aversion.
An accident of uncertain size d˜ is evaluated by the expected disutility E
Ë
f(d˜)
È
= qNk=0 fikd“,
where fik is the probability that the event causes exactly k deaths. While a priori unknown,
this probability can be approximated by the normalized frequency of size-k events; i.e.,
fik t f(k)/f , where f is the overall frequency of events that cause deaths (Evans and
13FN-criteria are used in various European countries (see Rheinberger 2010; Bedford 2013).
14A catastrophe accepting regulator would, of course, adopt a slope criterion “ < 1 .
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Figure 5: Example of an FN-diagram, source: Evans and Verlander (1997)
Verlander 1997).15 E
Ë
f(d˜)
È
is compared against some tolerability threshold Œ set by the
regulator. Risk is deemed intolerable if E
Ë
f(d˜)
È
> Œ .16 If the disutility function is assumed
to be quadratic, a risk-as-variance definition can be invoked (Stallen et al. 1996). In that
case, uncertainty over the distribution of fatalities is regarded as a major cause of catastrophe
aversion and this concern can be directly incorporated as a function of the spread of the
distribution: social risk is deemed intolerable if E
Ë
d˜
È
+ Ÿ‡
Ë
d˜
È
> Œ , where Ÿ > 1 is an
aversion factor that accounts for the spread in the distribution of fatalities as measured by
its standard deviation ‡
Ë
d˜
È
.
Regulatory frameworks that have adopted one of the above SRC pursue a two-step
approach. They first assess the tolerability of risk before and after the implementation of
one or more policies. In the second step, they discard policy options that do not satisfy the
tolerability criterion and perform the cost-benefit assessment only for the remaining policy
15Bedford (2013) argues that the approximation is mistaken for rare events (involving large n) and therefore
di cult to defend in settings such as climate catastrophes. Instead, he proposes a two-parameter disutility
function that extends the above approach to account for uncertainty in fik.
16Bohnenblust and Slovic (1998) propose to marry the expected disutility criterion with standard CBA by
multiplying for each policy option the expectation over the weighted number of deaths E
#
f(d˜)
$
rather than
the expected number of deaths E
#
d˜
$
by the VSL, obtaining a money measure of the disutility of lives lost.
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options (Pate-Cornell 2002). The major problem we see with intolerability criteria and similar
decision standards is that they are not well grounded theoretically. Yet, in the absence of a
theoretical foundation, how can such standards form a robust and comprehensive basis for
regulatory decisions?
5.3 The Political Economy of Catastrophe Risk Regulation
Why is it that some risks receive a lot of attention both from policymakers and the general
public, while others go almost undetected despite their potentially catastrophic nature? Con-
sistent with the Social Amplification of Risk perspective (Kasperson et al. 1988) we suggest
that several politico-economic factors may help to explain why and how society decides to
emphasize one risk, but not another. Due to limited space we can discuss only a few factors
that are of particular relevance for understanding social attitudes toward catastrophe risk.
Perception. In The Law of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle‚ Sunstein (2005)
forcefully argues that developed countries invest too much in the prevention of low-probability,
high-impact risks. Sunstein’s core argument combines insights from psychology and political
economy: the public tends to overestimate the probability of dreaded events, and policymak-
ers respond to the public’s fears and anxieties in a populist manner.17 Breyer (1993) had
made a similar point before, alluding to the excessive congressional reaction to popularized
risks—toxic waste in this case—as the “vicious circle of risk regulation”. Wiener (2015) adds
that catastrophe risks are prone to what he calls the “unavailability” heuristic: uncommon
risks are not available to human perception since they are, by definition, rare events.18 It is
therefore not contradictory that people overestimate low risks like plane crashes or tornados
(Slovic et al. 2000), but underestimate or ignore rare risks altogether (Klinke and Renn
2002). This might explain Posner’s (2004) observation that policymakers respond to catas-
17The issue of whose perceptions should ultimately count in public policy is analyzed in Portney (1992),
Pollack (1998), Johansson-Stenman (2008), and Salanie and Treich (2009) among others.
18Wiener notes that blockbuster movies like Deep Impact or The Day After Tomorrow do little to al-
leviate the unavailability heuristic since the public tends to perceive such movies as what they are: good
entertainment.
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trophe risks far less than to other, more common risks. The summarized arguments suggest
a complex pattern of policymakers’ responses to catastrophe risk, which might well depend
on a number of other factors directly linked to the public’s perception.
Responsibility. Another crucial factor for understanding the regulation of risks is the
question of responsibility. In a world that encounters evermore man-made risks, we forge our
own destiny (Giddens 1999). Two questions come to the fore: Who is to determine which
risks society accepts and which ones it does not? And who is to blame in the event of a
catastrophe? It seems natural that government has a particular responsibility in overseeing
activities that involve the risk of potentially many fatalities. It does so by enforcing safety
standards and by intervening if those standards are not complied with. Firms engaged in
hazardous activities are another social entity involved in the regulation of risks. Through
regulatory guidelines they are required to operate so that the residual risk of accident is as
low as reasonably practicable (Pate-Cornell 2002). While firms are generally liable for their
activities, they may not be su ciently capitalized to pay the compensations associated with a
big accident. Limited liability in turn reduces a firm’s incentive to invest in the prevention of
accidents. Government may hence require firms to buy insurance coverage. This “surrogate
regulation” restores some incentives for prevention by encouraging firms to undertake loss
reduction measures and by monitoring their operations (Freeman and Kunreuther 1997).
Both the legal system and insurance o er possibilities to successfully manage large
risks. Yet we need to keep in mind that extreme events may be large enough to harm or even
destroy institutions. For example, it is unlikely that the court system would be operating
after a large asteroid collision or that the Maldives could fully insure against the sinking of
their islands. Anticipating the dysfunction of institutions in the aftermath of a catastrophe
undermines their e ectiveness in managing catastrophe risks (Wiener 2015).
Free-riding and group interest. Global risks raise issues similar to the problem of the
commons, but on a bigger scale. The challenge of international negotiations on climate change
or nuclear energy programs provides ample illustration. Typically, various interest groups
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have stakes in risk regulation and therefore seek to influence the regulator. The influence of
particular groups often depends on the characteristics of the risk. One key criterion for the
regulators’ response to catastrophic threats is how regulatory costs and benefits are shared.
Consider a policy intervention that seeks to reduce air pollution. The corresponding cost
is borne by all taxpayers, but the benefits go primarily to people living in large cities. It
is unclear how the relative group size a ects policymaking: if the group of people exposed
to air pollution is large, the policy enjoys more political support; at the same time, there
are stronger incentives to free-ride in collective action settings (Olson 1971). The more
catastrophic a risk is, the larger these incentives are, because more people are potentially
a ected, albeit with a smaller individual probability.
Regulatory costs might be borne by a specific industry that contributes to generating
the potential catastrophe in the first place, as in the case of GHG emissions. Yet it is
well known that the causative principle triggers strong political opposition and the influence
and visibility of various lobby groups matters a lot for “pricing” catastrophe avoidance.
Regulatory capture—the fact that a firm or industry may gain control over the agency meant
to regulate it—is a significant problem in government decision-making (La ont and Tirole
1991), especially when it comes to hazardous activities.19 Interest groups exert pressure
on politicians and/or policymakers who are concerned about their reputation (Kuran and
Sunstein 1999). They typically do so with the help of the media, which have an important
role in shaping the public’s perception of risks that may (or may not) have the potential for
a catastrophe. This may explain why not all catastrophes receive the same level of public
attention (Eisensee and Strömberg 2007).
19In the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, von Hippel (2011) commented in a New York Times op-ed:
“Nuclear power is a textbook example of the problem of ‘regulatory capture’ [...which] can be countered only
by vigorous public scrutiny and Congressional oversight [...].”
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6 Conclusions
The current paper has presented a framework to think systematically about catastrophes—
the big ones that are going to increase both in frequency and size as ever more people live on
our planet, and the very big ones that threaten the existence of humanity. We have argued
that standard economic approaches to assess environmental, health, and safety risks do not
account for important dimensions such as the sheer size of a catastrophe or the disutility of
bereavement. Other approaches can be conceived of. We have formally defined the notions
of catastrophe aversion and acceptance, respectively. Evaluations based on these notions
capture di erent ex post attitudes toward social risk. Our review of existing empirical choice
studies suggests that, in many contexts, people tend to be catastrophe accepting.
It is hard to say which motives drive catastrophe accepting attitudes. We have discussed
several behavioral phenomena that may explain the observed empirical patterns. Perhaps
the most important one is inequity aversion. Since a more catastrophic situation is generally
also more equitable ex post, there is a clear link between catastrophe and equity. Maximal
ex post equity is attained in the extreme case wherein either nobody or everybody dies.
We end up with a somewhat dissatisfactory reply to the two questions posed in the
introduction. It is not clear whether we are, nor whether we should be, catastrophe averse.
In future research, it may be interesting to study how the context systematically shapes our
attitudes toward catastrophe risk. It may also be useful to identify the political forces (e.g.,
populism, responsibility, lobbying) that may induce or hinder regulatory action in regard
of a looming catastrophe. On the normative side, we see a need to characterize optimal
risk policies in economic models under catastrophe sensitive preferences. Our discussion has
revealed that various disciplines including decision theory, behavioral economics, psychology,
social choice and risk management have di erent perspectives on these issues. This calls for
more integrated research on the management of catastrophe risks.
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